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Abstract
A recurring theme in the mathematical social sciences is how to select the “most desirable” elements
given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Schwartz’s tournament equilibrium set (TEQ)
ranks among the most intriguing, but also among the most enigmatic, tournament solutions that have
been proposed so far in this context. Due to its unwieldy recursive definition, little is known about
TEQ. In particular, its monotonicity remains an open problem up to date. Yet, if TEQ were to satisfy
monotonicity, it would be a very attractive tournament solution concept refining both the Banks set and
Dutta’s minimal covering set. We show that the problem of deciding whether a given alternative is
contained in TEQ is NP-hard.
1 Introduction
The central problem of the literature on tournament solutions is as appealing as it is simple: Given an ir-
reflexive, asymmetric, and complete binary relation over a set, find the most attractive elements of this set.
As the standard notion of maximality is not well-defined in the presence of cycles, numerous alternative so-
lution concepts have been devised and axiomatized (see, e.g., Moulin, 1986; Laslier, 1997). In social choice
theory, the base relation, which we call dominance relation, is commonly defined via pairwise majority
voting, and many well-known tournament solutions yield attractive social choice correspondences.
Over the years, the computational complexity of almost all common solution concepts has been com-
pletely characterized (see, e.g., Woeginger, 2003; Conitzer, 2006; Brandt et al., 2007; Brandt and Fischer,
2007). One notable exception is the tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) proposed by Schwartz (1990). Due to
its unwieldy recursive definition, little is known about TEQ (Dutta, 1990; Laffond et al., 1993). However, if
a certain technical conjecture stated almost two decades ago turned out to be true, it would constitute one of
the most attractive tournament solutions, refining both the minimal covering set and the Banks set (Laslier,
1997; Laffond et al., 1993). Laslier states that “Unfortunately, no algorithm has yet been published for find-
ing the Minimal Covering set or the tournament equilibrium set of large tournaments. For tournaments of
order 10 or more, it is almost impossible to find (in the general case) these sets at hand” (Laslier, 1997, p. 8).
While it has recently been shown that computing the minimal covering set is feasible in polynomial time
(Brandt and Fischer, 2007), it turns out that this is not the case for TEQ unless P equals NP. We prove this
by first providing an alternative hardness proof for the Banks set which is then modified so as to apply to
TEQ as well. In contrast to the Banks set, there is no obvious reason to suppose that the TEQ membership
problem is in NP; it may very well be even harder.
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2 Preliminaries
A tournament T is a pair (A,≻), where A is a finite set of alternatives and ≻ an irreflexive, anti-symmetric,
and complete binary relation on A, also referred to as the dominance relation. Intuitively, a ≻ b signifies
that alternative a beats b in a pairwise comparison. We write T for the class of all tournaments and we have
T (A) denote the set of all tournaments on a fixed set A of alternatives. If T is a tournament on A, then every
subset X of A induces a tournament T |X defined as (X,≻|X), where ≻|X = {(x, y) ∈ X × X : x ≻ y}.
As the dominance relation is not assumed to be transitive in general, it may contain cycles. Moreover,
there need not be a so-called Condorcet winner, i.e., an alternative that dominates all others. This makes that
the usual notions of maximum and maximal elements are no longer feasible in this context. Other concepts
have been suggested to take over the role of singling out those alternatives that can somehow be considered
the “winners” of the tournament. Formally, a tournament solution S is defined as a function that associates
with each tournament T on A a subset S (T ) of A. The definition of a tournament solution commonly includes
the requirement that S (T ) be non-empty if T is defined on a non-empty set of alternatives and that it select
the Condorcet winner if there is one (Laslier, 1997, p.37). For X a subset of A, we also write S (X) for
the more cumbersome S (T |X), provided that the tournament T is known from the context. In this paper
we will be concerned with two particular tournament solutions, the Banks set and Schwartz’s tournament
equilibrium set (TEQ). For a proper definition, however, we need some auxiliary notions and notations.
Let R be a binary relation on a set A. We write R∗ for the transitive reflexive closure of R. By the top
cycle TCA(R) we understand the maximal elements of the asymmetric part of R∗. A subset X of A is said
to be transitive if R is transitive on X. For X ⊆ Y ⊆ A, X is called maximal in Y if no proper superset of X
in Y is transitive, i.e., if there is no transitive Z ⊆ Y with X ⊂ Z. Clearly, every transitive set is contained in
a maximal transitive set. Given a set Z = {Zi}i∈I of pairwise disjoint subsets of A, a subset X of A will be
called a choice set for Z if it contains precisely one element from each subset Zi ∈ Z.
In tournaments, maximal transitive sets are also referred to as Banks trajectories. The Banks set BA(T )
of a tournament T then collects the maximal elements of the Banks trajectories.
Definition 1 (Banks set) Let T be a tournament on A. An alternative a ∈ A is in the Banks set BA(T ) of T
if a is a maximal element of some maximal transitive set in T .
The tournament equilibrium set of a tournament T on A is defined as the top cycle of a particular
subrelation of the dominance relation, the TEQ relation. The underlying idea is that an alternative is only
“properly” dominated, i.e., dominated according to the subrelation, if it is dominated by an element that is
selected by some tournament solution concept S . To make this idea precise, for X ⊆ A, we write DX(a) =
{ b ∈ X : b ≻ a } for the dominators of a in X, omitting the subscript when X = A. Thus, for each alternative a
one examines the dominator set D(a), and solves the subtournament T |D(a) by means of the solution S . In
the subrelation a is then only dominated by the alternatives in S (D(a)). This of course, still leaves open
the question as to the choice of the solution concept S . Now, in the case of TEQ, S is taken to be TEQ
itself! The reason why this is a proper recursive definition is that if a ∈ X for some X ⊆ A the set DX(a)
of dominators of a in X is a proper subset of X. I.e., in order to determine the TEQ relation in a particular
subtournament T , one has to calculate the TEQ of a proper subtournament of T .
Definition 2 (Tournament equilibrium set) Let T be a tournament on A. For each subset X of A we define
the tournament equilibrium set TEQ(X) for X as follows:
TEQ(X) = TCX(→X),
where→X is defined as the binary relation on X such that for all x, y ∈ X,
x→X y if and only if x ∈ TEQ(DX(y)).
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Figure 1: Example due to Schwartz, 1990, where BA(T ) = {a, b, c, d} and TEQ(T ) = {a, b, c}. The relation→
is indicated by thick edges.
Observe that the TEQ relation→X is invariably a subset of the dominance relation ≻ and that if DX(x) , ∅,
then there is some y ∈ DX(x) with y→X x.
It can easily be established that the Banks set and TEQ both select the Condorcet winner in a tournament
if there is one. Moreover, in a cyclic tournament on three alternatives, the Banks set and TEQ both consist
of all alternatives. Yet, the Banks set and TEQ do not coincide for all tournaments. For an example consider
the tournament depicted in Figure 1. First we calculate the TEQ relation →. Observe that D(a) = {c}.
Hence, c is the Condorcet winner in D(a) and we have TEQ(D(a)) = {c} and c → a. For alternative b we
have D(b) = {a, e}. Since a ≻ e, alternative a is the Condorcet winner in D(b), and we may conclude that
TEQ(D(b)) = {a}. Hence, a → b whereas e 6→ b. In an analogous fashion we find for all x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}
that x → c if and only if x = b as well as that x → d if and only if x = a. For alternative e, however,
D(e) = {a, c, d}. Since a ≻ d ≻ c ≻ a, a three-cycle, we have that TEQ(D(e)) = {a, c, d} and hence a → e,
c → e as well as d → e. The top cycle of the relation → thus found can then be seen to coincide with
the set {a, b, c}, which then also constitutes the TEQ of this tournament. By contrast, the Banks set in this
example consists of the four elements a, b, c and d. Maximal transitive sets of which a, b, c and d are the
maximal elements are, e.g., {a, b, d}, {b, c}, {c, a, e} and {d, c, e}, respectively. Alternative e is not included
in the Banks set. The only transitive subsets of which e is the maximal element are {e} and {e, b}. However,
both these sets are included in maximal transitive sets of which e is not the maximal element, e.g., the set
{a, e, b}. Thus TEQ and the Banks set may differ. However, the former is known to always be included in
the latter.
Proposition 1 (Schwartz, 1990) Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament. Then, TEQ(T ) ⊆ BA(T ).
Proof: We prove by structural induction on X that TEQ(X) ⊆ BA(X) for all subsets X of A. The case X = ∅
is trivial, as then TEQ(X) = BA(X) = ∅. So, assume that TEQ(X′) ⊆ BA(X′), for all X′ ( X. We prove that
TEQ(X) ⊆ BA(X) as well. To this end, consider an arbitrary a ∈ TEQ(X). Either DX(a) = ∅ or DX(a) , ∅.
In the former case, a is the Condorcet winner in X and therefore a ∈ BA(X). In the latter case, x →X a for
some x ∈ X. Having assumed that a ∈ TEQ(X), i.e., a ∈ TC(→X), there is also an x′ ∈ X with a →X x′.
Accordingly, a ∈ TEQ(DX(x′)). By the induction hypothesis, also a ∈ BA(DX(x′)). Therefore, there is some
maximal transitive set Y in DX(x′) of which a is the maximal element. Then, Y ∪ {x′} is a transitive set in X.
Now let Y ′ ⊆ X be a maximal transitive set in X containing Y∪{x′} with a′ as maximal element. Observe that
a′ ∈ BA(X). Then, a′ ≻ x′ and so a′ ∈ DX(x′). Now consider Y ′ ∩DX(x′). Clearly, Y ∩DX(x′) is a transitive
set in DX(x′) which contains a′ as its maximal element. Moreover, Y ⊆ Y ′ ∩ DX(x′). By maximality of Y it
then follows that Y = Y ′ ∩ DX(x′) and that a = a′. We may conclude that a ∈ BA(X). 
In the remainder of this paper, we assume the reader to be familiar with the well-known complexity
classes P and NP and the notion of polynomial-time reducibility (see, e.g., Papadimitriou, 1994).
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Algorithm 1 Tournament Equilibrium Set
procedure TEQ(X)
R ← ∅
B ← C ← arg mina∈X |D(a)|
loop
R ← R ∪ {(b, a) : a ∈ C ∧ b ∈ TEQ(D(a))}
D ←
⋃
a∈C TEQ(D(a))
if D ⊆ B then return TCB(R) end if
C ← D
B ← B ∪C
end loop
3 A Heuristic for Computing the Tournament Equilibrium Set
It is not very hard to see that the naive algorithm for computing TEQ, which simply recursively computes→,
requires exponential time in the worst case. Running time can be greatly reduced by using a heuristic that
relies on the conjecture that the top cycle of any TEQ relation consists of only one strongly connected
component. This conjecture was already made by Schwartz (1990) and has later been shown to be equivalent
to the (conjectured) monotonicity of TEQ (Laffond et al., 1993). Algorithm 1 computes TEQ by starting
with the set B of all alternatives that have dominator sets of minimal size. These alternatives are likely to
be included in TEQ and the small size of their dominator sets speeds up the determination of their TEQ-
dominators. In the following, all alternatives that TEQ-dominate any alternative in B are iteratively added
to B until no more such alternatives can be found, in which case the algorithm returns the top cycle of
B. Clearly, the worst-case running time of this algorithm is still exponential, and it will be shown in the
remainder of the paper that this has to be the case for every algorithm computing TEQ unless P = NP.
4 An Alternative NP-Hardness Proof for Membership in the Banks Set
The problem of deciding whether a particular alternative is included in the Banks set of a given tournament
T is known to be NP-complete. This was first demonstrated by Woeginger (2003) by means of a reduction
from graph three-colorability. Here we will give an alternative proof of this result. Our proof works by a
reduction from 3SAT , the NP-complete satisfiability problem for Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal
form with exactly three literals per clause (see, e.g., Papadimitriou, 1994). The construction used in this
paper is arguably simpler than Woeginger’s. Moreover, a much similar construction will be used in the next
section to prove NP-hardness of the analogous decision problem for TEQ. The tournaments used in these
reductions will both be taken from a special class T ∗, which we introduce next.
Definition 3 (The class T ∗) A tournament (A,≻) is in the class T ∗ if it satisfies the following properties.
There is some odd integer n ≥ 1, the size of the tournament, such that A = C ∪ U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Un, where
C,U1, . . . ,Un are pairwise disjoint and C = {c0, . . . , cn}. Each Ui is a singleton if i is even, and Ui =
{u1i , u
2
i , u
3
i } if i is odd. The complete and asymmetric dominance relation ≻ is such that the following five
properties hold for all ci ∈ Ci, c j ∈ C j, ui ∈ Ui, u j ∈ U j (0 ≤ i, j ≤ n):
(i) ci ≻ c j, if i < j,
(ii) ui ≻ c j, if i = j,
(iii) c j ≻ ui, if i , j,
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(iv) ui ≻ u j, if i < j and at least one of i and j is even (i.e., ui or u j is a separating node),
(v) uki ≻ uli, if i is odd and k ≡ l − 1 (mod 3) (i.e., u1i ≻ u2i ≻ u3i ≻ u1i ).
We also refer to c0 by d, for “decision node” and to ⋃1≤i≤n Un by U. For i = 2k, we have as a notational
convention Ui = Yk = {yk} and set Y =
⋃
1≤2k≤n Yk. These nodes are called separating nodes.
Observe that this definition fixes the dominance relation between any two alternatives except for some pairs
of alternatives that are both in U.
As a next step in the argument, we associate with each instance of 3SAT a tournament in the class T ∗.
An instance of 3SAT is given by a formula ϕ in 3-conjunctive normal form (3CNF), i.e., ϕ = (x11 ∨ x21 ∨
x31) ∧ · · · ∧ (x1m ∨ x2m ∨ x3m), where each x ∈ {x1i , x2i , x3i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} is a literal. For each clause x1i ∨ x2i ∨ x3i
we assume x1i , x
2
i and x
3
i to be distinct literals. We moreover assume the literals to be indexed and by Xi we
denote the set {x1i , x
2
i , x
3
i }. For literals x we have x¯ = ¬p if x = p, and x¯ = p if x = ¬p, where p is some
propositional variable. We may also assume that if x and y are literals in the same clause, then x , y¯. We
say a 3CNF ϕ = (x11 ∨ x21 ∨ x31) ∧ · · · ∧ (x1m ∨ x2m ∨ x3m) is satisfiable if there is a choice set V for {Xi}1≤i≤m
such that v′ = v¯ for no v, v′ ∈ V . Next we define for each 3SAT formula ϕ the tournament T BAϕ .
Definition 4 (Banks construction) Let ϕ be a 3CNF (x11 ∨ x21 ∨ x31) ∧ · · · ∧ (x1m ∨ x2m ∨ x3m). Define T BAϕ =
(C ∪ U,≻) as the tournament in the class T ∗ of size 2m − 1 such that for all 1 ≤ j < 2m,
U j =



Xi if j = 2i − 1,
{yi} if j = 2i
and such that for all x ∈ Xi and x′ ∈ X j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ m),
x ≻ x′ if both j < i and x′ = x¯ or both i < j and x′ , x¯.
Observe that in conjunction with the other requirements on the dominance relation of a tournament in T ∗,
this completely fixes the dominance relation ≻ of T BAϕ .
An example for such a tournament is shown in Figure 2. We are now in a position to prove NP-completeness
of deciding whether a particular alternative is in the Banks set.
Theorem 1 The problem of deciding whether a particular alternative is in the Banks set of a tournament is
NP-complete.
Proof: Membership in NP is obvious. For a fixed alternative d, we can simply guess a transitive subset of
alternatives V with d as maximal element and verify that V is also maximal w.r.t. set inclusion.
For NP-hardness, we show that T BAϕ contains a maximal transitive set with maximal element d if and
only if ϕ is satisfiable. First observe that V is a maximal transitive subset with maximal element d in T BAϕ
only if
(i) for all 1 ≤ i < 2m there is a u ∈ Ui such that u ∈ V , and
(ii) there are no 1 ≤ i < j < 2m, u ∈ Ui, u′ ∈ U j with u, u′ ∈ V such that u j ≻ ui.
Regarding (i), if there is an 1 ≤ i < 2m such that no element of Ui is contained in V , we can always add ci
to V in order to obtain a larger transitive set. If (ii) were not to hold, both i and j have to be odd for u j to
dominate ui. However, in light of (i), there has to be k with i < k < j and u′′ ∈ Uk such that u′′ ∈ V . It
follows that V is not transitive because u, u′′, and u′ form a cycle. If there is maximal transitive set V with
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p q ¬r
p s r
¬p s q
y2
y1
d
c1
c3
c5
c2
c4
Figure 2: Tournament T BAϕ for the 3-CNF formula ϕ = (¬p ∨ s ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ s ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ q ∨ ¬r).
maximal element d complying with both (i) and (ii), a satisfying assignment of ϕ can be obtained by letting
all literals contained in X ∩ V be true.
For the opposite direction, assume that ϕ is satisfiable. Then there is a choice set W for {Xi}1≤i≤m such
that x′ = x¯ for no x, x′ ∈ W . Obviously V = W ∪ {y1, . . . , ym−1} ∪ {d} does not contain any cycles and
thus is transitive with maximal element d. In order to obtain a larger transitive set with a different maximal
element, we need to add ci for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m to V . However, V ∪ {ci} always contains a cycle consisting
of ci, d, and u for some u ∈ Ui, contradicting the transitivity of V ∪ {ci}. We have thus shown that d is the
maximal element of some maximal transitive set in T BAϕ containing V as a subset. 
5 NP-hardness of Membership in the Tournament Equilibrium Set
As the main result of this paper, we demonstrate that the problem of deciding whether a particular alternative
is in the TEQ of a tournament is NP-hard. To this end, we refine the construction used in the previous section
to prove NP-completeness of membership in the Banks set.
Definition 5 Let ϕ a 3-conjunctive normal form (x11 ∨ x21 ∨ x31) ∧ · · · ∧ (x1m ∨ x2m ∨ x3m). Further for each
1 ≤ i < m, let there be a set Zi = {z1i , z
2
i , z
3
i }.Define T TEQϕ as the tournament (A,≻) in T ∗ of size 4n − 3 such
that A = C ∪ U1 ∪ · · · ∪ U4n−3 and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
U j =



Xi if j = 4i − 3,
Zi if j = 4i − 1,
{yi} otherwise.
As in the Banks construction, we let for all x ∈ Xi and x′ ∈ X j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ m)
x ≻ x′ if both j < i and x′ = x¯ or both i < j and x′ , x¯.
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p q ¬r
z12 z
2
2 z
3
2
p s r
z11 z
2
1 z
3
1
¬p s q
y4
y3
y2
y1
d
c1
c3
c5
c7
c9
c2
c4
c6
c8
Figure 3: Tournament T TEQϕ for the 3-CNF formula ϕ = (¬p ∨ s ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ s ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ q ∨ ¬r). Omitted
edges are again assumed to point downwards.
Finally, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, xki ∈ Xi and zlj ∈ Z j,
xki ≻ z
l
j if and only if i < j or both i = j and k = l.
An example for such a tournament is shown in Figure 3.
We now proceed to show that a 3SAT formula ϕ is satisfiable if and only if the decision node d is in the
tournament equilibrium set of T TEQϕ .
Lemma 1 Let T = (C ∪ U,≻) be a tournament in T ∗ and let B ⊆ C ∪ U such that d ∈ B. Then, for each
u ∈ U ∩ B there exists c ∈ C ∩ B such that c→∗B u
Proof: Let ci ∈ C ∩ B be such that DB(ci) ∩ C = ∅, i.e., ci is the alternative in C with the highest index
among those included in B. Then,
ci →B c for all c ∈ B ∩ C with c , ci. (1)
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For this, merely observe that by construction ci is the Condorcet winner in DB(c). Hence, ci ∈ TEQ(DB(c))
and ci →B c.
The lemma itself then follows from the stronger claim that for each u ∈ U ∩ B there is some c ∈ C ∩ B
with both c→∗B u and c ∈ TEQ(B). This claim we prove by structural induction on supersets B of {d}.
If B = {d}, U ∩ B = ∅ and the claim is satisfied trivially. So let {d} be a proper subset of B. Again, if
U ∩ B = ∅, the claim holds trivially. So we may assume there be some u ∈ U ∩ B. Then, d ∈ DB(u) by
construction of T . If DB(u)∩U = ∅, DB(u) is a non-empty subset of C∩B, and so is TEQ(DB(u)). It follows
that for some c ∈ TEQ(DB(u)) ∩ C we have c →B u. If, on the other hand, DB(u) ∩ U , ∅, the induction
hypothesis is applicable and we have c ∈ TEQ(DB(u)) for some c ∈ C ∩ B. Hence, c →B u. With u having
been chosen arbitrarily, we actually have that for all u ∈ U ∩ B, there is some c ∈ C ∩ B with c →B u. It
remains to be shown that there is some c ∈ C ∩ TEQ(B) with c→∗B u.
To this end, again consider ci ∈ C ∩ B such that DB(ci) ∩ C = ∅. It suffices to show that ci →∗B b for all
b ∈ B, as then both ci ∈ TEQ(B) ∩ C and ci →∗B u. So, consider an arbitrary b ∈ B. If b = ci, the case is
trivial. If b ∈ C ∩ B but b , ci, we are done by (1). If instead b ∈ U ∩ B, then c →∗B b for some c ∈ C ∩ B,
as we have shown in the first part of the proof. If c = ci, we are done. Otherwise, we can apply (1) to obtain
ci →B c
′
→
∗
B b and hence ci →
∗
B b. 
Theorem 2 Deciding whether a particular alternative is in the tournament equilibrium set of a tournament
is NP-hard.
Proof: By reduction from 3-SAT. Consider an arbitrary 3-DNF ϕ and construct the tournament T TEQϕ =
(C ∪ U,≻). This can be done in polynomial time. We show that
ϕ is satisfiable if and only if d ∈ TEQ(T TEQϕ ).
For the direction from left to right, observe that by an argument analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 it
can be shown that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if d ∈ BA(T TEQϕ ). So assuming that ϕ is not satisfiable yields
d < BA(T TEQϕ ). By the inclusion of TEQ in the Banks set (Proposition 1), it follows that d < TEQ(T TEQϕ ).
For the opposite direction, assume that ϕ is satisfiable. Then there is a choice set W for {Xi}1≤i≤m such
that x′ = x¯ for no x, x′ ∈ W . Obviously W ∪ {y1, . . . , ym−1} ∪ {z ji ∈ Z : x
j
i ∈ W} = {u1, . . . , un} contains no
cycles and thus is transitive. Without loss of generality we may assume that ui ∈ Ui for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n+1, define a subset Du1,...,uni of alternatives as follows. Set D
u1,...,un
n+1 = A and let D
u1 ,...,un
i denote⋂
i≤ j≤n+1 D(u j) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, D
u1,...,un
1 ( · · · ( D
u1,...,un
n+1 . In an effort to simplify notation, we
write →i and Di(x) for →Du1 ,...,uni and DDu1 ,...,uni (x), respectively. We will also assume u1, . . . , un to be fixed
and write Di for D
u1 ,...,un
i . It then suffices to prove that
d ∈ TEQ(Dk), for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1. (2)
The theorem then follows as the special case in which k = n + 1. We first make the following observations
concerning the TEQ relation→i in each Di, for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n + 1:
(i) u j ∈ Di if and only if j < i,
(ii) c j ∈ Di if and only if j < i,
(iii) ci →i+1 c j if j < i ≤ n,
(iv) ui →i+1 ci, if i ≤ n.
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For (i), observe that if j < i, u j ∈ D(ui) by transitivity of the set {u1, . . . , un}. Hence, u j ∈ Di. If on the other
hand j ≥ i, then u j < D(u j) and thus u j < Di. For (ii), observe that c j ∈ D(ui) for all i , j and thus c j ∈ Di
if j < i. However, c j < D(u j) and hence c j < Di if j ≥ i. For (iii), merely observe that ci is the Condorcet
winner in Di+1(c j), if j < i ≤ n. To appreciate (iv), observe that by construction Di+1(ci) has to be either a
singleton {ui} for some ui ∈ Ui, or Ui itself. The former is the case if Ui ⊆ Y , or if Ui ⊆ X and i , n. The
latter holds if Ui = Un or if Ui ⊆ Z. In either case, TEQ(Di+1(ci)) = Di+1(ci) and ui →i+1 ci holds. For
the case in which Ui ⊆ X with i , n, let Ui = {ui, u′i , u
′′
i }. By construction, Ui+2 ⊆ Z and u
′
i , u
′′
i < D(ui+2).
Accordingly, u′i , u
′′
i < Di+1. Form ui ∈ Di+1 it then follows that Di+1 ∩ Ui = {ui}.
We are now in a position to prove (2) by induction on k. For k = 1, observe that d is a Condorcet winner
in D1 and thus d ∈ TEQ(D1). For the induction step, let k = i + 1. With observation (i) we know that
ui ∈ Di+1 and, in virtue of the induction hypothesis, also that d ∈ TEQ(Di). Hence, d →i+1 ui. Moreover,
by observations (iii) and (iv), ci →i+1 d →i+1 ui →i+1 ci, i.e., ci, d and ui constitute a →i+1-cycle. In
virtue of Lemma 1 and observation (ii), we may conclude that ci →∗i+1 a for all a ∈ Di+1. Accordingly,
{ci, d, ui} ⊆ TCDi+1(→i+1) and d ∈ TEQ(Di+1), which concludes the proof. 
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